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COMMENTS ON MIRE v. HAWKINS
GEORGE W. HARDY, III*
BACKGROUND
In 1956, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the case of
Boddie v. Drewett,' in which it was determined (a) that a dry
hole drilled on a compulsory unit including a servitude tract but
at a location off the servitude tract would have no effect on the
running of prescription on the servitude; and (b) that if a com-
pulsory unit were established which included the entire servi-
tude tract and completely excluded the tract from the permissible
drilling area, the unitization order would constitute an obstacle
to the exercise of the servitude from the effective date of the
order to the time the unit well was capped and abandoned, if
unsuccessful, and for a reasonable time thereafter.
The refusal to apply the good faith dry hole concept to unit
operations was met with some disapproval in that it was felt
that within the contemplation of the conservation statutes the
unit operations should be considered as operations on all parts
of the unit and therefore as operations on the servitude, effective
as an interruption at least as to the portion included in the unit
if not as to the entirety of the servitude. The obstacle theory was
also subject to criticism by some in that there have been numer-
ous unit orders issued which have never been rescinded and
which have created units never drilled. Thus, there arose the
possibility that prescription might remain suspended by the pres-
ence of such obstacles for many years, a serious complication of
titles.
On the other hand, there were arguments which were made
in support of the Boddie decision's refusal to apply the dry hole
rule. One is that particularly in the developmental stage when
temporary units are established the unit boundaries frequently
do not coincide with subsurface limits of a reservoir. Thus, it
would be quite within the realm of possibility for a servitude
owner to be given credit for a use when there was no reasonable
chance, in fact, that a well could be completed which would drain
his property. Also, it is to be observed that, without any im-
plication of impropriety, the unitization process is a rather
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1. 229 La. 1017, 87 So. 2d 516 (1956).
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dynamic and inexact one and is subject to a certain amount of
manipulation, which might open the way for struggles to include
servitude tracts in drilling units with the hope of securing an
interruption of prescription by drilling operations. A further
motivation for the refusal to apply the dry hole rule might have
been found in the possibility that the owner of the servitude tract
might be an involuntary participant in the unit and might, there-
fore, be in a position to escape any liability for the cost of drill-
ing the hole under present law. 2 Thus, the servitude owner would
have failed to participate in the "use" for which he sought to
receive credit.
Insofar as the obstacle theory was concerned, there was some
basis for arguing in support of the decision in that it gave recog-
nition to the fact that the servitude owner's use rights, particu-
larly the freedom to choose the timing and location of wells
(perhaps a theoretical freedom in many instances) are substan-
tially inhibited by the conservation laws permitting the Commis-
sioner of Conservation to control the location and number of
wells in a particular field by establishing units and selecting
unit operators. Additionally, even though most conservation or-
ders are applicable to only a single sand, the effect of the ob-
stacle to drilling might be quite real as the affected sand might
be the only potentially productive horizon or, even though more
potentially productive horizons might exist, it might be difficult
to secure development of any other sands without the right to
test all potential sands.
THE DECISION IN MIRE V. HAWKINS
In Mire v. Hawkins,3 the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
its prior decision in Boddie v. Drewett,4 in what may be termed a
2. In Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.. 165 So. 2d 905 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964), it was held that an "owner" as defined in R.S. 30:3(8) who pro-
vokes a conservation hearing and seeks to acquire an interest in a proposed unit
can be made liable for its proportionate share of drilling costs in cash. Thus,
the unit operator's right to recover costs is not limited to withholding produc-
tion, the method pursued in Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495
(1942). Thus far, the Commissioner of Conservation has taken no formal steps
to alleviate the problem of the nonconsenting owner in a drilling unit on which
a dry hole is drilled. The holding in the Superior Oil Co. case was carefully
limited, and thus it seems that under present law there is no means for forcing
a nonconsenting owner to pay the costs of a dry hole. With a similar statute,
Oklahoma has worked out several alternative solutions to this problem. See
Curlee, The Problen of the "Free Riding" Lessee and Some Suggested Solu-
tions, NINTh ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 21 (1962).
3. 249 La. 278, 186 So. 2d 591 (1966).
4. 229 La. 1017, 87 So. 2d 516 (1956).
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rather startling opinion. The central question presented on ap-
peal was whether a unit order including only a portion of the
servitude tract and designating a small portion of the tract as
lying within the permissible drilling area would create an ob-
stacle to the use of all or any part of the servitude. The court of
appeal5 had refused to apply Boddie v. Drewett,6 distinguishing
it on the ground that the unit in question had included only a
portion of the servitude tract, leaving the remainder open for
development and also on the basis that the order in question had
designated a portion of the servitude tract as lying within the
permissible drilling area.
The Supreme Court, however, chose to overrule Boddie, both
as to its refusal to apply the dry hole rule and as to its applica-
tion of the obstacle theory. The new decision is far reaching.
Its basic import is clear in that the dry hole rule now may be
applied to unit operations and the obstacle concept is apparently
dead insofar as it was applied to the effect of unitization orders.
However, this does not mean that all questions have been an-
swered. Like the old decision in Boddie it leaves many problems
to be pondered.
Of passing interest regarding the Mire decision is the fact
that Chief Justice Fournet and Justice McCaleb dissented from
the Mire opinion in strong terms. The Chief Justice had con-
curred in the decree in Boddie v. Drewett7 and Justice McCaleb
wrote the opinion in the earlier case. However, Justice Haw-
thorne, who signed the Boddie opinion, concurred in the Mire
case and handed down a short opinion in which he noted that
he concurred "fully in the views of the majority."" Justice
Hamiter, who had concurred in the decree in Boddie joined in
the majority opinion in Mire v. Hawkins.9
EVALUATION OF MIRE V. HAWKINS
Of course, the primary matters to be evaluated in the Mire
opinion are its disavowal of the obstacle concept articulated in
Boddie v. Drewett1° and its recognition of the dry hole rule as
applicable to unit operations. The majority opinion seems to
5. Mire v. Hawkins, 177 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
6. 229 La. 1017, 87 So. 2d 516 (1956).
7. Ibid.
8. Mire v. Hawkins, 249 La. 278, 186 So. 2d 591, 597 (1966).
9. 249 La. 278, 186 So. 2d 591 (1966).
10. 229 La. 1017, 87 So. 2d 516 (1956).
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have based its rejection of the obstacle concept on the idea that
the servitude owner's use rights are not taken from him by a
unitization order. Rather, the unit operator is deemed to become
some sort of agent for the participants in the unit, with the
result that any operations conducted by him are operations for
all concerned. Thus, the court reasoned, the servitude owner's
use rights are not taken away; they are transformed so that
rather than operating through his own lessee, as would normally
be the case, he now operates through the unit operator. This
means, of course, that the application of the dry hole rule be-
comes a necessary concomitant of doing away with the obstacle
concept, which is based upon the notion that the servitude owner
is effectively deprived of the use rights inherent in his servitude
and thus should be given credit for a suspension of prescription
during the period of deprivation. If it is asserted that the servi-
tude owner is not deprived of his use rights, he must obviously
be given credit for such use as takes place by unit operations.
The majority felt the result reached in its opinion to be more in
keeping with the policy and concepts underlying the conservation
laws than the obstacle concept utilized in Boddie v. Drewett.11
The rejection of the obstacle concept was heavily criticized
by the dissenting Justices. Justice McCaleb urged that there was
nothing in the conservation laws which demanded the result
reached by the majority and that the result of the majority was
to refuse to apply the articles of the Civil Code12 which should
govern the property system in the absence of direct conflict with
conservation laws or orders requiring that private rights yield.
Chief Justice Fournet relied heavily on the argument that as
the servitude owner was being deprived of his development
rights by the conservation order it would be an unlawful taking
of property without just compensation to hold that the order did
not create an obstacle suspending the accrual of the prescription
of nonuse.' 3
11. Ibid.
12. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 792 (1870).
13. "The legislature, in adopting its comprehensive statute in this field . . .
and aware of the danger of having it declared unconstitutional if it unduly or
unjustly impinged on valuable property rights in these resources, or unreasonably
restricted the contractual rights of the owners with respect thereto, was careful
in fixing the powers and duties of the commissioner to so limit them as to not
deprive the owners of their private and contractual rights. Consequently, the
power and authority vested in the commissioner under this law is not limited
to the conservation of these natural resources and the prevention of their waste.
The commissioner is also compelled to protect the rights of all owners that are
affected by his actions under the statute. Any order of the commissioner that
[Vol. XXVII
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Reflection on the opinions rendered in the Mire case produces
a strong reaction that the problem most certainly has more than
one side to it. The majority opinion seems to adopt the notion
,that the obstacle theory and the dry hole rule as applicable to
unit operations are necessarily inconsistent. This is not true. It
would be quite possible to sustain the existence of an obstacle
and to apply the dry hole rule. Certainly under the previous law
there was a use of the obstacle theory in combination with the
rule that use occurs by unit production. The only difference
between the two situations is that recognizing the dry hole rule
is simply the addition of another mode of use by unit operations.
There is nothing mutually inconsistent between the two con-
cepts. On the other hand, it does seem that adoption of the dry
hole rule is essential if the obstacle theory is not to be recognized.
As noted, if it is to be said that the servitude owner has not lost
his use rights but has merely had them transformed so that he
operates through the unit operator, he must clearly be given the
benefit of any operations conducted by the unit operator. Other-
wise there would certainly be an injustice, and perhaps, as sug-
gested by the Chief Justice, a taking of property rights without
just compensation.
It is to be admitted that the result of the Mire decision is
consonant with the concept of the conservation act in the sense
that unit operations benefit all interests within the unit boun-
daries. 14 However, as suggested, there is nothing to prohibit
retaining the obstacle concept and also applying the dry hole
unnecessarily deprives any owner of his private property rights for a purpose
other than the conservation of the natural resources is, therefore, in violation
of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 2
of Article I of the Constitution of Louisiana, which clearly provide that private
property shall not be taken for public use or purposes unless just and adequate
compensation is paid, and, further, in violation of Section 10 of Article I of the
Constitution of the United States which prohibits the states from passing any
law that impairs the obligation of contracts, and of Section 15 of Article IV
of the Constitution of Louisiana, which provides that no laic shall be passed
'impairing the obligation of contracts' and that 'vested rights' cannot be divested,
'unless for purposes of public utility, and for just and adequate compensation
previously paid.' (The emphasis has been supplied.)" Mire v. Hawkins, 249 La.
278, 186 So.2d 591, 603 (1966).
14. It is to be observed that the Conservation Act does not specifically pro-
vide that drilling operations conducted on a drilling unit shall be considered
as if they were conducted on all portions of the unit. Yet it is specific in other
instances. In R.S. 30:9B it is provided that the presence of a unit well capable
of production in commercial quantities constitutes every part of the unit a
"developed area." In R.S. 30:10A(1) (b) it is provided that production allocable
to a tract included in a unit shall, when produced, be "considered as if it has
been produced from [the] tract by a well located thereon." The fact that the
act is specific in these particular instances lends support to the notion that the
legislative intent was to the contrary in the case of drilling operations and that
1966]
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concept. As has been observed by the author elsewhere, 15 in
considering all cases involving the effects of unitization or unit
operations on prescription of mineral interests the court is
basically engaged in legislating rules of use applicable to unit
operations just as it originally did in evolving the rules of use
applicable to operations on the servitude premises. In the Mire
case there is some evidence of a recognition of the real meaning
of the unitization cases. One may question, however, whether the
better part of wisdom lay in taking the course chosen.
The Obstacle Theory
Considering a case such as Boddie v. Drewett,0 in which the
entire servitude was included in the unit in question, there is
merit to the view that the servitude owner is deprived of his use
rights. There is also merit to the suggestion that it is somewhat
unrealistic to say that the unit operator in reality becomes the
agent for the servitude owner in using the servitude by unit
operations. One must consider the fact that the servitude owner
may be an involuntary participant in the unit, which might mean
that there would be no liability whatsoever for the cost of drill-
ing a dry hole on the unit. In realistic terms, it does not seem
reasonable to believe that under such circumstances the unit
operator would act in any fashion as an agent in the sense of
acting for the benefit of the servitude owner in protecting the
property interest of such a "principal." Thus, the concept on
which the majority opinion is based, the idea that the servitude
owner's use rights are transformed rather than taken, though
theoretically supportable, may not be functionally sound.
Considering the merits of the obstacle theory itself, there
were, as observed in the beginning, sound bases for criticism
such operations would not be considered as operations on all parts of the unit
in the same manner as production. However, it seems that the court is correct
in the basic philosophy which it derives from the act. Everything in the provi-
sions relating to unitization points toward the idea that operations conducted
by a unit operator are in a material sense for the benefit of all parties entitled
to participate in the unit. This is perhaps even more true under present adminis-
trative procedure because the commissioner of conservation now accomplishes the
functions of establishing a drilling unit, pooling all property interests involved,
and appointing a unit operator in a single order whereas the act contemplates
the issuance of a unitization order followed by a pooling order. See R.S. 30:9
and R.S. 30:10. Administrative practice was for a number of years harmonious
with the procedure contemplated by the act. However, it has since been changed
to achieve greater efficiency. The present administrative practice lends some sup-
port to the court's view.
15. Hardy, Ruminations on the Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices
on the Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Mineral Royalty, 25 LA. L. REV. 824
(1965).
16. 229 La. 1017, 87 So. 2d 516 (1956).
[Vol. XXVII
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of it. It is certainly true that the Boddie case has caused sub-
stantial title problems in those situations in which unitization
orders have been issued but no drilling has ever taken place.
However, the solution to this problem might have been reached
by administrative regulations, by judicial decision, or legisla-
tively without dispensing entirely with the obstacle concept,
which has some decent foundations in terms of the realities of
petroleum development.
As to the problem of servitudes only partially included in the
unit, it appears that the court of appeal's position was reason-
able. Basically, it was held that if the unitization order were not
deemed to "divide" the servitude in a technical sense, then no
obstacle existed as drilling was still permissible on the acreage
outside the unit. On the other hand, if the unitization order were
deemed to divide the servitude, the court of appeal held that
there was no obstacle as to the outlying acreage and also that
there was none as to the included acreage as a portion of the
included acreage was at all times within the permissible drilling
area. The two dissents in the Supreme Court both appear to
have been based on the notion that such a division did take
place. However, they departed from the court of appeal's ap-
proach in that neither opinion gave any effect to the fact that
a portion of the servitude premises lay within the drilling area."1
Whether the fact that the unit operator was or was not the servi-
tude owner's lessee might be of significance does not appear
from the opinions.
Insofar as the rejection of the obstacle theory is concerned,
then, there is at least some question whether the Mire case was
the wisest possible decision. Certainly it solves some substantial
title problems created by the Boddie case, .ut these might well
have been cared for by other means. On the whole, the approach
of the court of appeal seems to the author to have been prefer-
able.
The Dry Hole Rule
Turning to the problem of the dry hole rule, it has already
been observed that if the obstacle theory was to be disposed of
on the theory that the servitude owner was not deprived of his
17. Chief Justice Fournet's opinion is express in this regard. Justice Mc-
Caleb's opinion is not quite clear. However, it seems necessarily based upon the
same idea.
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operating rights by the unitization order but merely had them
transformed, it was imperative to give him credit for unit opera-
tions otherwise sufficient to interrupt prescription if conducted
on the servitude premises. As to the wisdom of the dry hole rule
itself, there is some room for argument in that, as noted, the
servitude owner may not be contributing to the "use" which
takes place. The servitude owner may be given credit for a use
without ever being liable to contribute to the cost of exploration,
the only manner in which an actual use can take place under
the circumstances, unless, of course, the drilling is successful
and the operator can withhold production to secure payment of
well costs. i s Thus, the Mire decision opens up the possibility
that under present law a servitude owner may be given credit for
a use when he has in no sense of the word exercised his rights,
even in the changed form in which he finds them as a result of
the unitization order. Certainly the new rule is beneficial in
that it places the law relative to maintenance of mineral servi-
tudes by unit operations more in line with that applicable to
mineral leases (in the absence of a "Pugh clause"). 19 This in
itself can be seen as a substantial benefit to the law. There
has never seemed to the author to be any logical reason for dis-
tinguishing between the effect of unit operations on lease main-
tenance and the effect of such operations on prescription ac-
cruing against servitudes. After all, the leases in question are
often taken on mineral servitudes, and it makes little sense to
say that the unit operations maintain the lease if they do not
maintain the servitude.
SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
There are some distinct problem areas presented by the Mire
decision. First, what is the extent to which the dry hole rule
will be applicable? If a servitude tract is partially included in a
unit on which drilling operations sufficient to interrupt prescrip-
tion are conducted, will the interruption extend only to the in-
cluded portion or to the entire servitude? There are indications
in the opinion that only the included portion will be affected.
The court cites and relies on Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co.
18. Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495 (1942). But see Supe-
rior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 165 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964).
19. Delatte v. W'oods, 232 La. 341, 94 So. 2d 281 (1957); LeBlanc v. Dan-
ciger Oil & Refining Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950); Hunter Co. v.
Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
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v. Federal Land Bank20 in reaching its decision. This can be
taken as a strong indication that the concept of "division" of
the servitude will be continued in application to unit operations
taking place off the servitude premises. This concept of divisi-
bility has been criticized by the writer.21 To enter into further
criticism of the concept at this point seems unnecessary; how-
ever, it can be observed that the divisibility concept has caused
title problems of substantially greater magnitude than those cre-
ated by the Boddie decision. Perhaps reconsideration is war-
ranted in this area. Further, it is noteworthy that in its recent
decision in Trunkline Gas Co. v. Steen, 2 the court has refused
to apply the divisibility concept when unit operations occur on
the servitude premises. Thus, even though the unit includes
only a part of the servitude tract, unit operations conducted on
the servitude premises will interrupt prescription as to the
whole. It is of interest in this regard that Chief Justice Four-
net, who dissented in Mire v. Hawkins and strongly supported
the divisibility concept in that and prior decisions, wrote the
opinion of the majority in the Steen case.2 3
Another problem arises on consideration of the court's state-
ment that a compulsory unitization creates a "common prop-
erty," and that the unit operator becomes a representative or
agent of those entitled to participation in the unit, whether they
are voluntary or involuntary participants. This language leads
one to conjure up many specters. By using the term "common
property," does the court intend that the unitization shall have
the effect of a cross-conveyance? This would clearly be con-
trary to prior jurisprudence.2 4 Further, if the operator is a
representative or agent, does this import any form of fiduciary
relationship? Will the operator, for example, be bound to act in
the best interest of his "principals" and to protect their prop-
erty interests by drilling expeditiously to avoid the accrual of
prescription? Will this "agency" relationship have any impact
20. 230 La. 41, 87 So. 2d 721 (1956).
21. Hardy, Ruminations on the Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices on
the Louisiana Servitude and the Mineral Royalty. 25 LA. L. REV. 824 (1965).
22. 249 La. 520, 187 So. 2d 720 (1966).
23. The court displayed rather remarkable harmony of views in the Steen case
in that five members of the court joined in the majority opinion. Justice Hamiter
concurred in the result and Justice Summers dissented with written reasons.
24. Arkansas-La. Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Prod, Co., 221 La. 608, 60
So. 2d 9 (1952) ; cf. Martel v. A. Veeder Co., 199 La. 423, 6 So. 2d 335 (1942) ;
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate and Oil Co., 185 La. 751, 170
So. 785 (1936). See also Whitwell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 257
F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1958).
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on the question of liability for development costs? What is its
impact on questions of liability for royalty payments and rights
of participants in cases of split-stream sales or sales by an op-
erator who has a gas contract when other participants do not.
One may also speculate whether the participation or non-
participation of the servitude owner or his lessee in develop-
ment costs will be of significance in the application of the dry
hole rule. If a servitude owner or his lessee has not contributed
or is not liable to contribute to development costs, should he be
given credit for a use when he has done nothing to contribute
to the operation for which he seeks to receive credit as an inter-
ruption of prescription? Certainly the administrable solution
is to decide that contribution to development costs is of no sig-
nificance, but this does have its shortcomings.
A fourth area of difficulty is the problem of retrospective
effect. The decision involves a change in a rule of prescription,
which, though it affects all existing rights, is not deemed to be
any sort of deprivation of property. It is certainly retrospective
in that all previously created servitudes will be affected by it.25
However, the matter of whether all prior suspensions will now
be wiped out is left untreated.
These are perhaps rather far-fetched extensions of the lan-
guage of the court and the problems created by the decision.
Nevertheless, the potential implications in the court's language
cannot be overlooked, and the consequences of this decision
clearly include the creation of some significant problems.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Mire v. Hawkins26 can certainly be charac-
terized as unexpected. Such reversals of established rules of
property are rare indeed, and the decision may be criticized
on that ground alone, as indeed it was by the Chief Justice.27
On its merits, the decision does eliminate the title problems
which emanated from Boddie v. Drewett.28 However, there is
25. Cf. United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Leiter
Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961); Whitney
National Bank of New Orleans v. Little Creek Oil Co., 212 La. 949, 33 So. 2d
693 (1947).
26. 249 La. 278, 186 So. 2d 591 (1966).
27. 186 So. 2d at 607.
28. 229 La. 1017, 87 So. 2d 516 (1956).
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at least some foundation for arguing that the obstacle concept,
despite its troublesome consequences, was a reasonable recog-
nition of the limitations which the conservation regime places
upon mineral servitude owners' use rights, even accepting the
theory that such rights are not completely emasculated but are
transformed as to the manner of their exercise. Further, as
already observed, the reversal creates as many problems as it
solves. Insofar as the dry hole rule is concerned, its application
can be said to be logical in view of the conservation act and nec-
essary in the absence of the obstacle theory, but if it is applied
in conjunction with the concept of divisibility in cases of partial
unitization, there is little doubt that it will create some very
serious title problems, compounding the difficulty already caused
by the finding of a "division" in cases of production from an
off-premises unit well serving only a portion of the servitude
tract. In the writer's opinion, the basic principle of indivisibility
of servitudes should be applied in cases involving the effect of
unit drilling operations or production on partially unitized min-
eral servitudes, with the result that operations interrupting pre-
scription will interrupt as to the whole of the servitude, and not
merely the unitized portion. Otherwise, the title system becomes
highly, and needlessly, complex. This, however, is a separate
problem, and seems unlikely to be the subject of judicial recon-
sideration. Of Mire v. Hawkins 29 it can be said that if it elimi-
nated some problems, it brought an equal number of new ones.
29. 249 La. 278, 186 So. 2d 591 (1966).
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